Ensure MID Server Users Have Appropriate Access Levels

Verify that your MID Server user accounts does not have more the necessary granted permissions.

Granting the MID Server user account admin-level privileges (such as admin, security_admin or discovery_admin) violates the principle of least privilege and dramatically expands the attack surface.

Administrators sometimes grant elevated permissions to quickly resolve connectivity issues or enable integrations, but fail to remove them afterward. This leaves a service account with excessive access than necessary to perform its legitimate functions of facilitating communication between the ServiceNow instance and external systems within your network.

Review the User Roles [sys_user_has_role] table for MID Server users and confirm that the following roles are not assigned:

access_analyzer_admin, activity_admin, actsub_admin, admin, advisor_admin, agent_security_admin, ai_user_admin, aig_admin,
ais_admin, all_high_security_admin, aisa_admin, alm_admin, analytics_categories_admin, analytics_filter_admin, analytics_task_admin,
announcement_admin, antivirus_admin, app_engine_admin, app_metadata_admin, app_template_admin, approval_admin, assessment_admin,
assignment_rule_admin, asset_admin, auth_factors_admin, backup_restore_admin, business_process_admin, business_rule_admin, canvas_admin,
catalog_admin, catalog_lookup_admin, certification_admin, change_admin, chart_admin, chat_admin, chat_analytics_admin, chat_survey_admin,
client_script_admin, clone_admin, clone_profile_admin, cmdb_consumer_admin, cmdb_dedup_admin, cmdb_import_admin, cmdb_inst_admin,
cmdb_ms_admin, cmdb_payload_admin, connection_admin, content_admin, core_ui_analytics_admin, cors_rule_admin, credential_admin,
currency_admin, currency_instance_admin, currency_instance_report_admin, customer_admin, data_classification_admin, data_destruction_admin,
data_manager_admin, data_policy_admin, decision_table_admin, df_connection_admin, discovery_admin, ecmdb_admin, email_access_notification_admin,
email_account_admin, email_client_admin, embedded_help_admin, evam_admin, export_set_admin, external_app_install_admin, fal_service_admin,
financial_mgmt_admin, form_admin, formula_admin, function_field_admin, graphql_schema_admin, guided_tour_admin, health_log_admin, hp_publisher_admin,
iam_security_admin, iar_admin, image_admin, import_admin, inbound_integration_metering_admin, integration_action_admin, inventory_admin, itil_admin,
itom_admin, kafka_admin, kafka_namespace_admin, knowledge_admin, live_feed_admin, megaphone_admin, metadata_admin, mi_admin, ml_admin,
mobile_analytics_admin, mobile_metadata_report_admin, ms_perm_no_extextend_admin, nlq_admin, nlu_admin

More information

Attribute	Description
Configuration name	sys_user_has_role.table, mid_server_user.role
Configuration type	User Roles (/sys_user_has_role.do)
Data type	User Roles [sys_user_has_role] record
Recommended value	mid_server, and additional custom roles that may vary based on customer integrations
Default value	mid_server
Fallback value	N/A
Category	Access control
Security risk	Severity score: 5.7 CVSS rating: Medium Security risk details: Granting the MID Server user account admin-level privileges represents a significant security vulnerability that violates the principle of least privilege and dramatically expands the attack surface. The MID Server acts as a bridge between trusted internal networks and the ServiceNow instance, processing credentials, executing discovery probes, and handling sensitive configuration data. If a MID Server user account with excessive privileges is compromised, an attacker gains broad access to critical data across the entire ServiceNow instance. This could enable data exfiltration of sensitive CMDB information, manipulation of incident records, unauthorized access to customer data, or even privilege escalation to compromise additional systems.
Functional impact	MID Server is expected to run as intended without admin-level privileges.
Dependencies and prerequisites	None